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CHAPTER I 
The study of religion and the rise of atheism: 
conflict or confirmation? 
Michael J Buckley S.j 
INTRODUCTION TO THE QUESTION 
'Religion' and 'theology' are not terms with fixed meanings and invari-
ant applications. They are rather copies or commonplaces - not in the 
sense of the familiar and the trite, but in the classical sense of linguistic 
variables, terms ambiguous and capacious enough to house a vast diver-
sity of meanings, arguments, and referents.' The interconnection of such 
topics constitutes neither a determined problem nor an exact proposition. 
It constitutes what John Dewey called 'a problematic situation', an inde-
terminate area out of which problems and their resolutions can emerge 
only if these ambiguous terms ;ire given specific meanings and definite 
applications within particular inquiries. 2 Recognising the ambiguity of both 
'religion' and 'theology', this paper proposes to obtain a greater purchase 
on the problematic situation they together delimit, first, by offering a few 
precisions on 'religion' as its meaning developed through history co reach its 
generic consensus in late modernity; and then, by exploring how the scien-
tific study of religion, so understood, came to engage one of the arguments 
of modern theology: the existence or non-existence of God. 
In a remarkable review of the scientific study of religion over a fifty-year 
period, Mircea Eliade provides a benchmark for chis project by selecting 
1912 as a date of particular consequence. 3 That year, five stars rose in the 
firmament. Emile Durkheim published his Formes elementaires de la vie 
religieuse. Sigmund Freud 'was correcting the proofs of Totem und Tabu, co 
be issued in book form the following year', and Carl Jung was publishing his 
' See Richard P. McKean, 'Creativity, and the Commonplace', in Mark Backman, ed., Rhetoric: 
Essays in Invention and Discovery (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1987), pp. 25-36. For com-
monplaces as linguistic variables, see Aristotle, Topics, 1.13-18, w5a20-w8a36; Rhetoric 1.2.1358a.io-35; 
2.23.1398a27-8. 
1 See John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. !05-8. 
J Mircea Eliade, 'The History of Religions in Retrospect: 1912 and After', in The Quest: History and 
Meaning in Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 12-36. 
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Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido. Raffaele Pettazoni's first monograph, 
La religione primitiva in Sardegna, appeared that same year, and Wilhelm 
Schmidt completed the first of the twelve volumes in his monumental study 
Der Ursprung der Gottesidee. 
In these five works, four very different methodologies advanced towards 
greater academic acceptance and influential presence in the scientific study 
of religion: the sociological, the psychological, the ethnological and the his-
torical. Eliade paints all this in broad brush strokes, depicting the intrinsic 
value and perduring authority of each of his chosen authors. What he does 
not examine or evaluate, however, forms the interest of this essay. For these 
seminal and even paradigmatic studies from the early twentieth century 
bore witness, in all of their diversity of methods, to an agreement and a 
controversy about religion: an agreement about the genus chat 'religion' 
had become over the centuries, and a controversy over the collateral that 
religion so understood would offer to belief and unbelief. 




To chart something of the lengthy journey by which 'religion' reached its 
generic and accepted understanding by 1912, chis essay proposes - as they 
do on the Mississippi - to take three soundings. It will drop a plumb 
line into the medieval controversies of Thomas Aquinas; then, gauge the 
modification of chat tradition in the heady days of Baroque scholasticism; 
and finally allow Eliade's Five to exemplify the 'religion' secured by lace 
modernity. Such discrete measurements might supplement, rather than 
repeat, the magisterial studies of such scholars as Wilfred Cantwell Smith 
and Peter Harrison. 
For Thomas Aquinas, 'religio' - irrespective of how one comes down on 
its etymology- 'properly denotes or implies a relationship to God (proprie 
importat ordinem ad Deum)'.5 More specifically, it designates a habit or a 
virtue by which one gives God what is due to God, and in this way lives 'in 
an appropriate relationship with God'. 6 But since it is impossible to render 
to God all that is owed to the divine goodness, religion always limps. 
Religion is like justice in that it renders to another what is his or her due. 
Because of its inherent inadequacy, however, it does not simply identify 
4 For the history of 'religion', see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion 
(Minneapolis: Forness Press, 1991), pp. 15-50. 
s Summa theologiae 2-2.81.1. 6 Ibid., 2-2.81.2. 
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with justice, but is a virtue joined to justice, i.e., a potential part of justice.7 
God enters into the constitution of religion not as its direct object, not chat 
to which it immediately attends, but as the end or purpose of what religi.o 
does properly attend to, i.e., any human action or thing chat embodies the 
worship and service of God. Such practices could be external activities like 
public adoration or sacrifice or vowing or, more importantly and primarily, 
internal actions such as devotion and prayer.8 These individual or social 
actions and cultic units are not religion; they are the acts and objects of 
religion. They look to God; religion looks co chem. Thus religio is a moral 
rather than a theological virtue, taking such human acts and practices as 
its direct objecc.9 
For chis reason, unlike the use of this term in the English Enlighten-
ment, religion could never substitute in Aquinas for faith, though to be 
'true religion' it had to be grounded on true faith. w But religion was com-
prehensive; it could command the acts ofall the virtues and human activities 
insofar as they were directed to the service and honour of God. 11 William T. 
Cavanaugh narrows the range and acts of religion considerably by main-
taining chat religi.o for St Thomas 'presupposes a context of ecclesial prac-
tices which are both communal and particular to the Christian Church'. 
It certainly includes these practices, but there is no justification for lim-
iting religio in this fashion. Religio can command a single and private act 
of worship or service as well as a communal one. Cavanaugh further and 
needlessly insists that 'religion refers specifically to the liturgical practices 
of the Church'. 12 Again these are certainly included in Aquinas's religio, 
7 Ibid., 2-2.80.prol and art. 1; 81.5,ad 3. 
8 Ibid., 2-2.81.1.ad 1; 81-4-ad 4; 81.7= 'Mens autem humana indiget ad hoc quod conjungatur Deo, 
sensibilium manuductione ... Et ideo in divino cultu necesse est aliquibus corporalibus uti, ut eis 
quasi signis quibusdam mens hominis excitetur ad spirituales actus quibus Deo conjungitur. Et ideo 
religio habet quidem interiores actus quasi principales et per se ad religionem pertinentes, exteriores 
vero actus quasi secundarios et ad interiores actus ordinatos.' (Emphasis added.) 
9 Ibid., 2-2.81.5. See In Boeth. De Trinitate 3.2: 'Ipsa camen religio non est virtus theologica: habet 
enim pro materia quasi omnes actus, ut fidei, vel virtutis alterius, quos Deo tamquam debitos ofFert; 
sed Deum habet pro fine. Colere enim Deum est hujusmodi actus ut Deo debitos offerre.' 
10 Pete! Harrison, 'Religion' and the religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp. 61fF. See In Boeth. De Trinitate 3.2: ' ... actus fidei pertinet quidem 
materialiter ad religionem, sicut et aliarum virtutum, et magis in quantum fidei actus est primus 
motus mencis in Deum; sed formaliter a religione distinguitur, utpote aliam rationem objecti con-
siderans. Convenit etiam fides cum religione praeter hoc, inquantum fides est religionis causa et 
principium. Non enim aliquis eligeret culcum Deo exhibere, nisi fide teneret Deum esse creatorem, 
gubernatorem et remuneratorem humanorum actuum.' 
11 Summa theologiae 2-2.186.1.ad 2; Su.ad 1. See In Boeth. De Trinitate 3.2: 'Sic ergo omnes actus qui bus 
se homo subjicit Deo, sive sine mencis, sive corporis ad religionem pertinent.' And even further: 'et 
sic diligencer consideranti apparet omnem accum bonum ad religionem pertinere.' 
12 William T. Cavanaugh, 'The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State', Modern Theowgy 11/4 
(October 1995), pp. 403-4. For the sweeping character of Aquinas's understanding of religio, see 
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but by no means exhaustive of it. Aquinas, relying explicitly upon Cicero, 
is far more generous in the inclusion he gives to religio. It can be pagan 
or Christian, private or social, as long as it directs one to the service and 
reverence of God. 
By che same ace, a human being both serves and worships God. For worship looks 
co the excellence of God, co which reverence is due. Service, however, looks co 
che subjection of the human person, who by reason of his condition is obliged co 
give reverence co God. To these two aces belong all the aces char are attributed 
co religion, because through all of chem the human being acknowledges the divine 
excellence and his subjection co God, either by offering something co God or also 
by accepting something divine'. 13 
This is far more sweeping than Christian liturgical practices and specific 
symbols and beliefs and is not constrained into the public/private distinc-
tion. Religi.o looks to all of the acts by which God is served and worshipped 
as 'principium creationis et gubernationis rerum', whether Christian or not. 14 
For Aquinas, pace Wilfred Cantwell Smith, chis virtue constituted the 
fundamental meaning of religio - a good habit, not 'an activity of the soul' 
and not just a 'prompting', but a developed capacity and inclinacion. 15 
What is astonishing to record is the close conjunction chat Aquinas draws 
between religio and sanctitas - in light of the role chat 'the sacred' will play 
later in the works of Durkheim and Eliade. Sanctitas and religio differ not 
in essence bur only in their grammar, as one might here translate ratione. 
Religio (dicitur) is said to look to all of the acts by which God is served 
and worshipped as 'principium creationis et gubernationis rerum' whether 
Christian or not, while sanctity (dicitur) bespeaks not only divine worship 
but 'the work of all of the virtues or all good works by which the human 
person disposes herself for divine worship.' 16 
It is here that institution entered into the ambit of Thomistic 'religio.' 
Those who dedicate their entire lives to chis divine service are called reli-
giosi, and their groupings and communities became 'religious orders' or 
2-2.81+ ad 2: 'Omnia, secundum quod in gloriam Dei fiunt, pertinent ad religionem, non quasi ad 
elicientem sed quasi ad imperantem; ilia aurem pertinent ad religionem eliciencem quae secundum 
rarionem sua speciei pertinent ad reverenriam Dei.' 
13 Summa theologiae 2-2.81.3.ad 2: 'Eodem acru homo servic Deo ec colic ipsum; nam culrus respicic 
Dei excellenciam, cui reverencia debetur; servitus aurem respicic subjeccionem hominis, qui ex sua 
condicione obligacur ad exhibendarn reverenciam Deo. Er ad haec duo pertinent omnes actus qui 
religioni accribuuncur, quia per omnes homo proresrarur divinam excellenciam ec subjeccionem sui 
ad Deum, vel exhibendo aliquid ei, vel eciam assumendo aliquid divinum.' 
14 Ibid., 2-2.81.3. 
' 5 See Smith, Meaning and End of Religion, p. 32. See In Boeth. De Trinittlle 3.2: 'religio est specialis 
virtus, in accibus omnium virrucem specialem rarionem objecci considerans, scilicer Deo debirum.' 
•6 Summa theologiae 2-2.81.3. 
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'religions'. '7 'Religion' not only denoted a virtue, but also the 'status' of 
those whose vows were specified by chat virtue. 
In the thirteenth century, religio combined into a phrase chat bespoke an 
Augustinian rather than a Ciceronian heritage. At least sixty-eight times, 
Aquinas, following a lead taken from Augustine, joined christiana with 
refigio. Indeed, he made the avowed purpose of the Summa theologiae 'co 
treat chose things that pertain co Christian religio in the manner chat would 
be appropriate co the instruction of beginners'. 18 But what was meant by this 
christiana refigio was not the institution and the set of characteristic beliefs, 
symbols, or ceremonial practices of the Church, as it is so often interpreted, 
bur rather something much closer co what one would today call Christian 
piety or devotion. Aquinas, of course, specified 'piety' quite differently, bur 
refigio remained a virtue that would govern and be expressed in practices 
and devotions. For Aquinas, these latter were not religion, either severally or 
collectively; they were the objects of religion. With such an understanding, 
it could make perfect sense co assert that 'the highest reaches of Christian 
religion consist in mercy in so far as one is speaking of exterior works; 
but che interior affection of charity, whereby we are united with God, 
cakes precedence over love and mercy towards our neighbor'. 19 Aquinas 
never gives any indication that Christianity is one institutional religion out 
of many, that religion was a genus specified into various communities of 
different beliefs, practices and traditions. In fact he never groups refigio 
with other traditions such as the Jewish, Muslim or pagan. 
In this understanding of 'religion', John Calvin and Huldreich Zwingli 
seem much closer to Aquinas. When Zwingli titled his book, Devera et folsa 
religione commentarius, he was not distinguishing between two communi-
ties with their characteristic and divergent beliefs, symbols and practices. 
He differentiated, as had Lactantius before him, between two different 
attitudes cowards worship. 20 True religion is chat piety or reverence chat 
emerges from the comprehensive entrustment of oneself to the true God 
in faith; false religion occurs when this reverence is given to anything other 
than God. 21 When John Calvin published Christianae refigionis institutio in 
1536, he was writing not about 'the' Christian religion - one denomination 
1
7 Ibid., 2.81.1.ad 5 and 2-2.186.1.ad 2. 
18 Ibid., Prologue:' ... ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent eo modo cradere secundum quod 
congruit ad erudicionem incipiencium.' 
19 Ibid., 2-2.30.4.ad 2: ' ... summa religionis Christianae in misericordia consistit quantum ad exte-
riora opera, interior tamen affectio caritatis, qua conjungimur deo, praeponderat et dileccioni et 
1nisericordiae in proxirnos. 1 
20 Smith, Meaning and End of Religion, pp. 27-8. 
21 Ibid., pp. 35-6, 224 n. 83, 84. For the meaning of vera religio in Aquinas, see 2-2.81.3.sc. 
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among many other religious bodies - but about Christian piety. It was 
not until the nineteenth century that translations placed a definite article 
before the adjective 'Christian' and brought John Calvin into the more 
contemporary understanding of 'religion', one that he had never actually 
shared. 22 
This basic understanding of 'religion' allowed Schleiermacher to move 
consistently from a defence of religion as the intuition and feeling of the 
infinite in his youthful Uber der Religion to the Glaubenslehre in which 
the foundational concept is piety (Frommigkeit) or the feeling of absolute 
dependence. The intuition and feeling of the first identified with the piety 
of the second, and he was at pains to advance this understanding against the 
false attribution of religion to external forms, symbols and propositional 
beliefs. Kant equated his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone with a 
fundamental and habitual ethical orientation towards duty. 
One can register the beginnings of a radical change in religio, however, by 
taking a second sounding, this time among theologians of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries and specifically as it was bodied forth in the massively 
influential textbooks of Francisco Suarez. De virtute et statu religion is (1608-
9) continued much of the Thomistic tradition, with religio a moral virtue, 
realised in the vowed 'religious' state and sometimes modified by christiana 
to indicate the fundamental habit of Christian worship and service of God 
founded upon Christian faith. 23 But here one can discover also the subtle 
beginnings of what will become a sea change. For Suarez contended that 
the term religio - like 'fides' and 'votum' -was legitimately and 'customarily 
applied (tribui so/ere) not only to internal affect, but also to the external 
actions and, indeed, to the things (rebus) by which God was worshipped 
as also to the doctrina that teaches such worship or ceremony'. 24 Religion 
in this sense is no longer simply a virtue; it is also both things such as 
external ritual and ceremonial objects and the teachings and the beliefs that 
instruct about their appropriate use. Scripture is cited for the legitimacy 
22 Wilfred Cantwell Smith has it exactly right: 'To the author and those who first read it the title 
of Zwingli's book meant, "An essay on genuine and spurious piety"; and Calvin's, something like 
"Grounding in Christian piety"' (Meaning and End of Religion, p. 37). 
23 Francisco Suare2, S.J., 'Tractatus primus: De natura et essentia virtutis religionis', in Opus de virtute 
et statu religionis, in Opera omnia, editio nova, vol. XIII (Paris: Louis Vives, 1859), 3-76. The first 
two volumes, dealing with the virtue of religion, and XIV of the Opera omnia, were published by 
1609, while the second two volumes were published posthumously at Lyons in 1623 and 1625. See 
Joseph de Guibert, S.J ., The Jesuits: Their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice: A Historical Study, trans. 
William J. Young, S.J. (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1972), p. 268. 
24 Suare2, 'De natura et essentia virtutis religionis', 8a: ' ... advercere oportet nomen religionis non 
solum interno affectui, sed etiam exterioribus actionibus, imo et rebus quibus Deus colitur, rribui 
solere, atque etiam docuinae quae talem cultum vel caeremoniam docet.' 
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of chis extension as is Clement of Alexandria ('religio est actio quae Deum 
sequitur'), but not Aquinas or the medieval doctors. 
Thus, Suarez subsumes what Aquinas had called the acts or objects of 
religion into religion itself, and in doing so, he opens up religio to the cul-
tural and anthropological meanings and inquiries chat will constitute its 
character in modernity. He enters chis extension of the meaning of religi.o 
as one already in common usage. Religion's objects have come to constitute 
religion. Harrison would trace to the English Enlightenment the emergence 
of religio as denoting the externals of worship and practice. But this attri-
bution should go back farther, at least to the major influence chat mediated 
scholasticism to modern philosophy, Francisco Suarez, 'Doctor Eximius'. 25 
Because of his continuous presence within the textbook tradition, Suarez 
exercised a profound influence on subsequent centuries. 
One must note also chevirtuallycontemporary NaturalandMoralHistory 
of the Indies (1590) by the contentious polymath Jose de Acosta. Acosta took 
the understanding of religio as 'the belief system chat results in ceremonial 
behavior', as 'chat which is used (que usan) in their rites' by the American 
indigenous peoples. It was also around this period that the credal content 
of religion could be somewhat separated from ceremonies, and so it was 
emphasised chat 'religion' could substitute for 'faith' and become a genus -
as Jonathan Z. Smith so helpfully traces. Now religion as a generic system of 
beliefs and practices could break down into the constituent species of'Chris-
tianity, Mohametanism, Judaism and Idolatry'. The palm for advancing 
into popular reading the plural of'religion' in chis sense, i.e., for 'religions', 
seems to go to the redoucable Samuel Purchas with the 1613 appearance of 
the first volume of Purchas His Pilgrimage; or, Relations of the World and the 
Religions Observed in ALL Ages and Places Discovered from the Creation unto 
this Present ... In a year, following hard on its heels was Edward Brerewood's 
Enquiries Touching the Diversity of Languages and Religions through the Chiefe 
Parts of the World (1614).26 Here, we are much closer to modernity. 
' 5 Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 356-7. 
Maurer cites Suarez's presence in the education of Descartes and among the philosophical influences 
on Leibniz, Schopenhauer and Christian Wolff. 
' 6 See Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Religion, Religions, Religious', in Mark C. Taylor, ed., Critical Terms for 
Religious Studies (Chicago: Universiry of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 271-2. But the older usage did 
not die. Even when Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English language or the first edition of the 
Encydopa,dia Britannica took up 'religion', they bespoke the reverence that was due to God or the 
reasonable service of God. This was to continue in some variation the differentiation that obtained 
since the Middle Ages between the habit of religion and the objects - ceremonials, adoration, cult, 
and all of the virtues that religio could comprehensively command 'insofar as they were directed to 
the service and honor of God' (Summa theologiae 2-2.186.1.ad 2; Su.ad 1.). 
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A third sounding can be made as we come back co Eliade's an nus mirabiiis. 
Durkheim and Freud, Pettazoni, Jung and Schmidt are not talking about 
a particular human virtue or its characteristic functions. Religion was not 
a virtue; it had become 'things' - many of which it used to govern - but 
'things' in the sense of discrete units such as sacrifice and vows, moral prac-
tices and rituals and commitments, and also myths, beliefs and symbols 
indicative of or common to a particular communiry. Religion was a con-
geries of such 'things', marked by the sacred or by taboo or by the fearful. 
One religious system of such beliefs and practices could and should be dis-
tinguished from another; its identiry required it. And the conjoined units 
owned as sacred or interdicting were co be distinguished from another realm 
of 'things', chat of the profane. Like 'science' and 'arc', 'religion' changed 
from a qualiry of the human being or of a communiry co a territory of 
particular things, external things chat could be studied by sciences such as 
anthropology, sociology, psychology and ethnology to determine a specific 
culcure or cast of human character. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith describes - will subsequencly question - chis 
understanding of religion in its new form: 
Ir is customary nowadays to hold char there is in human life and society something 
distinctive called 'religion'; and chat chis phenomenon is found on earth ar present 
in a variety of minor forms, chiefly among outlying or eccentric peoples, and in a 
half-dozen or so major forms. Each of these major forms is also called 'a religion', 
and each one has a name: Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and so on. 27 
When one spoke of' the Christian religion', similariry of phrase hid the 
profound difference between the sense carried by' religion' in the nineteenth 
century and the understanding it bore for Aquinas and Calvin, Zwingli and 
even Suarez. Eliade's five authors might disagree on how religion should 
be further specified or what was worshipped, but they would agree that 
they were not dealing with human qualities, but with an aggregation of 
particular units. 
Thus, in Durkheim's logistical reading, 'alchough religion is a whole 
composed of parts - a more or less complex system of myths, dogmas, rites, 
and ceremonies- they operate as ifit formed a kind of indivisible entiry'. 28 
17 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Meaning and End of Religion, p. 15. 
18 Emile Durkheim, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 
1995), p. 33. 'At the foundation of all systems of belief and all cults, there must necessarily be a certain 
number of fundamental representations and a mode of ritual conduct that, despite the diversity of 
forms that the one and the other may have caken on, have the same objective meaning everywhere, 
and everywhere fulfill the same functions. It is these enduring elements that constitute what is 
eternal and human in religion. They are the whole objective content of the idea that is expressed 
when religion in general is spoken of.' Ibid., p. 4. 
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Durkheim's world bifurcates into the sacred and profane, and 'when a 
certain number of sacred things have relations of coordination and sub-
ordination with one another, so as to form a system chat had a certain 
coherence and does not belong to any other system of the same sort, then 
the beliefs and the rites, taken together constitute a religion'. 29 Thus it was 
chat 'religious phenomena fall into two basic categories: belief and rices. 
The first are states of opinion and consist of representations; the second are 
particular modes of action. Between all of these two categories of phenom-
ena lies all chat separates chinking from doing.' 30 What makes Buddhism 
a religion, Durkheim argued, is chat 'in the absence of gods, it accepts the 
existence of sacred things, namely the four Noble Truths and the practices 
chat are derived from chem'.31 
In Totem and Taboo, Freud lays out two basic components of religion, 
what will emerge in other works as compulsive practices whose motivations 
are hidden and deeply treasured beliefs about powerful realities whose jus-
tifications are equally unconscious.32 The most primitive form of these 
compulsive practices lay with taboo and exogamy, while the original focus 
of fear and reverence was the totem. 33 For Raffaele Pettazzoni, religion was 
itself one component within the more general category of culture. 'Reli-
gion is historically a form of culture and cannot be understood save in the 
framework of chat particular culture of which it is a part, and in organic 
association with its other forms, such as art, myth, poetry, philosophy, 
economic, social, and political structure.' 34 Each of these denoted a set of 
organically interrelated things. As one spoke of Greek art or poetry consti-
tuted by their own proper objects, so one could speak of Greek religion in 
contrast with ocher religions and of religion in general in contrast with the 
ocher territories of art, myth, poetry and philosophy. 
With almost scholastic precision, Wilhelm Schmidt defined religion 
.both as beliefs and objects. 'Subjectively, it [religion] is the knowledge and 
consciousness of dependence upon one or more transcendental, personal 
19 Ibid., p. 38. Jo Ibid., p. 34. J' Ibid., p. 35 (emphasis added). 
Jl Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, trans. James Srrachey, with a biographical introduction by Peter 
Gay (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989). pp. 36-7, 109-10; 97ff. 
JJ 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' (1907) had already charred the parallels between religious 
practices and obsessive neurosis, while The Future of an Illusion would point up the analogies between 
religious ideas and Meyerr's amenria, 'a state of acute hallucinatory confusion'. Sigmund Freud, The 
Future of an lllusio11, trans. James Srrachey (New York: W. W Norton, 1961), pp. 55-6, cf. esp.n. 5. 
J4 Raffaele Pertazroni, 'Introduction to the History of Greek Religion,' in his Essays on the History of 
Religio11s, trans. H.J. Rose (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), p. 68. Ugo Bianchi points our that with La 
religione primitiva in Sardegna Pettazzoni indicates his shift from classical archaeology to the history 
of religions. Ugo Bianchi, 'Pettazroni, Raffaele (1883-1959)', in Mircea Eliade, ed., The Encyclopedia 
of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1986), vol. II, p. 261. 
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powers, to which man stands in a reciprocal relation. Objectively, it is the 
sum of the outward actions in which it is expressed and made manifest, as 
prayer, sacrifice, sacraments, liturgy, ascetic practices, ethical prescriptions, 
and so on.' 35 The insistence upon reciprocal personal relations made it 
necessary for Schmidt to exclude early Buddhism. Later Buddhism would 
make the cut because it 'has included in its wide-reaching system innumer-
able personal deities' .36 Finally, in Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, Carl 
Jung takes for granted that religion is a composite of its own set of things, 
in contrast with 'things of a wholly other sort than religion'. It is a world 
of proper religious myths, rituals, hymns, dogmas and symbols, with 'its 
object, original sin'.37 These components gave religion its unique concen-
tration and differentiation from the sets of other objects. In fact, part of the 
contemporary problem lies in a shift from one to the other: 'To the degree 
that the modern mind is passionately concerned with anything and every-
thing rather than religion, religion and its prime object- original sin - have 
mostly vanished into the unconscious. That is why, today, nobody believes 
in either ... '38 It is religion that presents as religious objects or symbols 
the transformed contents of the unconscious, transposing and transform-
ing them into religion's own world of objects or images.39 '1n religion, the 
regressive reanimation of the father-and-mother imago is organized into a 
system.' 40 
In this generic constitution of religion as a set of particularly designated 
units, contrasting with the parallel territories of art or science or even pol-
itics, religion became a subset of human culture. One studies religion in 
order to come to understand something about the character of human 
beings themselves, something about a particular human culture. Religion 
has become the cultural evidence for the human. Durkheim spoke for 
35 Wilhelm Schmidt, S.Y.D., The Origin and Growth of Religion: Facts and Theories, trans. H.J. Rose 
(New York: Dial Press, 1931), p. 2. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido was translated as Psychology of the Unconscious: A Study of the 
Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido, trans. Beatrice M. Hinkle (New York: Dodd, Mead 
and Company, 1947), p. 81. For the psychological truth of symbols and myths that are 'in actual 
truth ... misleading', seep. 262. 
38 C. J. Jung, Symbols of Transformation, Bollingen Series no. 20, trans. R. F. C. Hull (New York: 
Pantheon, 1956), p. 72. This is a translation of Symbole der Wandlung (Zurich: Rascher Verlag, 1952), 
which is itself a fourth revised edition of Wandlungen und Symbok der Libido. For this ciration in 
the earlier work, see pp. 81-2. Jung continues: 'This disbelief in the devilishness of human nature 
goes hand in hand with the blank incomprehension of religion and its meaning. The unconscious 
conversion of instinctual impulses into religious activity is ethically worthless, and often no more 
than an hysterical outburst.' 
39 Jung, Symbols of Transformation, p. 59; Psychology of the Unconscious, pp. 72-3. See Jung's previous 
discussion of the writing of Miss Miller and the narrative of the Book of Job. 
40 Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious, p. 99. For further projections into dogma, seep. 120. 
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almost all when he said that this study of religious phenomena in its struc-
tures and developments is finally 'to explain a present reality that is near to 
us and th us capable of affecting our ideas and actions. That reality is man. '41 
That is the reason that Jonathan Z. Smith can say so flatly, "'Religion" is an 
anthropological not a theological category' and insist that the history of 
'religion' prior to the sixteenth century is irrelevant to contemporary 
usage.42 Instead of inquiry into what is an appropriate response to the cre-
ative action and reality of God, there would be arguments about the cultures 
that constituted religion and its focus, whether god or gods needed to be 
involved in religion at all. And this brings this essay to its second question: 
how did this understanding of 'religion' enter into the atheistic discussion 
of these last centuries? 
ATHEISM AND THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 
The proponents of the newly formulated scientific studies of religion, as 
represented by Eliade's Five, were drawn into the conflict about Christian 
belief, especially that about the existence of God, as each of the warring 
sides looked to these studies to supply it with new resources. Max Millier, 
who coined the tide of the 'science of religion', claimed that the studies 
of the Vedas strengthened his Christianity, while E. B. Tylor believed that 
these 'scientific inquiries gave support to his personal stance of agnostic 
religious skepticism'. 43 Already in 1870, Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury) 
had brought out The Origin of Civilization and the First Condition of Man, 
proposing atheism as the initial and most primitive stage of religious belief 
and supplying this stage as an aboriginal prologue to Auguste Comte's 
famous triad. Appealing to the religious culture found among primitives, 
Lubbock found this Uratheismus not in an explicit denial of the reality of 
any god, but in the absence within these earliest cultures of all religion. 44 
41 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 1. Durkheim strongly advances the position that all religions are 
founded on the reality of the human. 'Even the most bizarre or barbarous rites and the strangest 
myths translate some human need and some aspect oflife, whether social or individual.' Ibid., p. 2. 
42 Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Religion, Religions, Religious', p. 269. These settlements made in the generic 
notion of religion, as represented by Eliade's five figures, had been secured comfortably by the turn 
of the century and have had their own pervasive and substantial presence within contemporary 
theological discourse. One has only to read, for example, the Nature of Doctrine: Religion and 
Theol.ogy in a Postliberal Age by the distinguished theologian, Professor George Lindbeck, one of 
the most influential works in theology ro appear in the 1980s, to find religion specified by three 
different kinds of'things': propositional statements and beliefs, symbols and feelings, terms and the 
grammar for their use and practice. 
43 Daniel L. Pals, Seven Theories of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 8. 
44 Schmidt, Origin and Growth of Religion, pp. 58-9. Lubbock enlarged Comte's triad generously by 
such additions as fetishism, totemism, shamanism and anthropomorphism. 
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This was to counter the earlier assertion of major figures from the German 
Enlightenment, such as Herder and Lessing, that religion constituted a 
universal constituent of the human spirit, and, more recently, the claim of 
Christopher Meiners's Allgemeine Kritische Geschichte der Religion (1806-7) 
that 'no people has ever existed without a religion'. Meiners was one of 
the first modern writers to make such an assercion.45By 1912, the lists were 
drawn. How one analysed religion had come to affect heavily the credibility 
of theistic convictions. How was this analysis to be done? Religion was no 
longer a subset of virtue, bur of culcure, and, as a subset of culture, it was 
to be studied according to the path mapped out by the exemplary studies 
of culcure. le was to busy itself with origins. Eliade recognised chat during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century: 
all Western historiography was obsessed with the quest of origins . .. Grear scholars 
wrote about the origin oflanguage, of human societies, of art, of institutions, of the 
lndo-Aryan races, and so on ... chis search for the origins of human institutions 
and cultural creations prolongs and completes the naturalist's quest for the origin 
of species, the biologist's dream of grasping the origin oflife, the geologist's and the 
astronomer's endeavor to understand the origin of the Earth and the Universe. 46 
This focus upon origins was something of a departure from an 
eighteenth-century past. In his Natural History of Religion, for example, 
David Hume had divided the inquiry into religion between two distinct 
questions: what are the foundations in reason of religion, and what is the 
origin of religion in human nacure?47 The nineteenth century collapsed 
these questions into one, and the truth about religion was co be found in 
its origins. 
So Durkheim attempted an understanding of contemporary religions 
by 'tracing historically the manner in which they have gradually taken 
shape'. 48 Origins would explain present reality. The real is not only che 
underlying; it is the antecedent, and the primitive was symptomatic of 
the prehistoric. So co understand religion 'we muse begin by going back 
to its simplest and most primitive form'. 49 Hence Durkheim concentrates 
upon the elementary forms of religion. The findings here will determine 
the character of everything else: 
45 See Seymour Cain, 'The Study of Religion: History of Study', in Eliade, ed., The Encydopedia of 
Religion vol. XIV, pp. 65-6. Cain writes that Meiners was one of the first modern writers to make 
this assertion, see p. 65. Christoph Meiners, Allgemeine Kritische Geschichte der Religion (Hanover: 
Helwing, 1806-7), 2 vols. 
46 Mircea Eliade, 'The Quest for the "Origins" of Religion', in The Quest, pp. 37-53. 
47 David Hume, The Natural History of Religion, ed. H. E. Root (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1957), 'Author's Introduction', p. 21. 
48 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 3. 49 Ibid. 
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Although religion is a whole composed of pares - a more or less complex system 
of myths, dogmas, rites, and ceremonies - they operate as if it formed a kind of 
indivisible entity. Since a whole can be defined only in relationship co the parts 
char comprise it, a better method is co cry co characterize che elementary phenomena 
from which any religion results, and then characterize the system produced by their 
union. 50 
The elementary was chat from which religion results. Freud also believed -
with some reserve - that one could get to the prehistoric by a study of prim-
itives, seeing in chem 'a well-preserved picture of an early stage of our own 
developmenc'Y Freud would rely upon studies done on the aborigines of 
Australia, and, like The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Totem and Taboo 
would assert chat 'it is highly doubtful whether any religion, in the shape 
of a worship of higher beings, can be attributed to them'.52 Boch Durkheim 
and Freud assert the worship of the totem as primordial and seminal of all 
religion. 53 Durkheim is content co establish chis as face and co recognise its 
origins as a surrogate for clan and community. Freud pushes beyond these 
findings of what he called 'social anthropology', back to Oedipal longings 
and the murder of the primal father. For psychoanalysis of the origins has 
shown chat 'at bottom God is nothing other than an exalted father ... Thus, 
while the totem may be the first form of father-surrogate, the god will be 
a later one.' 54 
Jung's Wandlungen und SymboLe der Libido also locates the origins of 
divinity within the projecting human subject: 'Psychologically understood, 
the divinity is nothing else than a projected complex of representations 
which is accentuated in feeling according to the degree of religiousness 
of the individual, so God is to be considered as the representative of a 
certain sum of energy (libido).' 55 At this stage of the development of Jung's 
psychological inquiries, God is the construction of the libido, fixed upon 
10 Ibid., pp. 33-4 (emphasis added). This determines the decision of Durkheim co focus upon primitive 
religions, specifically those of Australia, 'because the facts are simpler, the relations between them 
are more apparent'. 
1' Freud, Totem and Taboo, p. 3- One must, however, recognise that at least theoretically Freud was 
aware that 'it is never possible co decide without hesitation how far their present-day conditions and 
opinions preserve the primaeval past.' Ibid., p. 128. 
12 Ibid., p. 4 (emphasis added). 
H Ibid., p. 126. Freud accepts as his point of departure the statement ofW Wundt: 'at some time totemic 
culture everywhere paved the way for a more advanced civilization, and, thus, that it represents a 
transitional stage between the age of primitive men and the era of heroes and gods.' 
14 Freud, Totem and Taboo, pp. 182-3. 
55 Jung, Psychology of the Ur1cor1scious, p. 71. 'This energy, therefore, appears projected (metaphysically) 
because it works from the unconscious outwards, when it is dislodged from there, as psychoanalysis 
shows.' 
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the mother rather than the facher.56 This search for origins, thus, as in 
Freud or Durkheim or Jung, could counter with rival theories of origins 
any claimed stability of belief in what the Christian could recognise as God. 
Or it could constitute a support. The affirmation of the existence of 
God could also search for its evidences in the practices, symbols and beliefs 
chat make up the texture of 'religion'. Wilhelm Schmidt's Der Ursprung 
der Gottesidee cook up Andrew Lang's theory of high gods, i.e., of supreme 
beings chat predated in every primitive culture both animism and totem ism: 
Comparing the primitive cultures with the later ones we may lay down the general 
principle that in none of the latter is the Supreme Being to be found in so clear, 
so definite, vivid and direct a form as among the peoples belonging to the former 
[i.e., to primitive cultures] ... This Supreme Being is to be found among all the 
peoples of the primitive culture, not indeed everywhere in the same form or the 
same vigor, but still everywhere prominent enough to make his dominant position 
indubitable.57 
Thus an Urmonotheismus lies at the origins ofallsubsequencvariations of the 
object of religion, a supreme being chat is no more difficult for the primitive 
mind co infer than for it co recognise in anything made the necessity for a 
maker. Monotheism is at the origins, not the end, of human development. 
Bue against chis primitive monotheism, Pettazoni was in 'repeated polemics' 
and saw monotheism emerge as a 'revolution against polycheism'. 58 Thus 
he identified the sky-god (Rangi) as primordial or superior in the Maori 
pantheon, one who stands behind and is ultimately sublimated and raised 
to a higher plane as Io, the uncreated beginning of all chings. 59 
56 Ibid., p. 474. 'We have learned in the course of chis investigation chat the pare of the libido which 
erects religious structures is in the last analysis fixed on the mother, and really represents chat 
tie through which we are permanently connected with our origin ... As we have seen, this libido 
conceals itself in countless and very heterogeneous symbols.' This reading becomes clearer when one 
considers the centrality that Jung, at this stage, gave to incest desires and fantasies. In women this 
desire shows itself in che Father-Imago, 'for the idea of the masculine creative deity is a derivation, 
analytically and historically psychologic of the Father-Imago and aims, above all, to replace the 
discarded infantile father transference in such a way that for che individual che passing from che 
narrow circle of che family inco che wider circle of human socie1:y may be simpler or made easy.' 
Ibid., pp. 55-6. 
57 Schmidt, Origin and Growth of Religion, p. 257. 
58 Bianchi, 'Petta2roni, Raffaele', vol. II, p. 262. 
59 Raffaele Petta2zoni, 'Io and Rangi', in Essays 011 the History of Religions, trans. H.J. Rose (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1954), p. 42: 'It appears then that so lofty an attribute as omniscience also proves to be 
deeply rooted in the sky-natured substance of che Maori Supreme Being. On the whole it is Rangi 
the Sky who stands at the back of Io the Supreme Being. Lofty though che idea of lo is both in 
religion and speculation, its foundations lie in che nature worship of a sky-god. Io is in theory the 
universal cosmic principle, and as such the creator of Rangi and Papa and of the gods in che Maori 
pantheon. Bue in the lase analysis lo is Rangi himself sublimated and raised co a higher plane. This 
substantial identity is reflected, as above shown, not only in belief, but, what is more important, in 
ritual and religion.' For Io as the 'uncreated beginning of all things', seep. 37. 
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Thus, the quest for origins awakened a question that had hitherto been 
unknown in the West: how necessary was 'God' or some such figure for 
what had come to be called 'religion'? If Western thought had disposed of 
the medieval virtue of religion, could one not also dispose of what had been 
its purpose? Both E. B. Tylor and George Frazer had found religion without 
god. Religion, for Tylor, was 'belief in spiritual beings', and ancient peoples 
reasoned to these individual spirits within each thing. Gradually 'religion' 
developed from animism to the gods of polytheism. Frazer began with the 
personal and impersonal forces conjured by magic and took from William 
Robertson Smith the worship of the totem as the original foundation of 
all religion. Religion emerged out of magic as the human means of control 
moved from laws of contact and imitation to pleading and vows offered 
to win over the supreme spirits or gods.60 Spirits, forces, totems or gods, 
supreme god - the question which the inquiry into origins posed to the 
religious believer was far more comprehensive: did religion with its idea 
of god arise out of the self-revelation of god or did god arise as a cultural 
creation of human beings - a creation one could trace in the evolutionary 
progress of the idea? The pedigree of the term and the primordial character 
of its referent were called upon to settle the issue of the truth of fundamental 
theological claims. What was at the beginning became definitive. 
Why? Two immediate reasons suggest themselves to explain why the 
origins and character of the gods told directly upon the arguments for the 
existence of God: the argument from universal consent and the argument 
from the primordial revelation described in Genesis. 
Universal consent 
Design in the physical universe had furnished the principal evidence for 
the affirmation of the existence of God by thinking men in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, an affirmation grounded on discoveries advanced 
by the greatest scientific minds of this enlightened period such as Newton 
and Boyle and incorporated into the pervasive physico-theologies to which 
all the sciences were expected to contribute. In the nineteenth century, 
however, this justification of religious belief was yielding to three factors: the 
growing autonomy of the physical sciences as insisted upon by such as Pierre 
Simon de Laplace; the reserve about any extension of theoretical knowledge 
beyond objects of possible experience with David Hume and Immanuel 
Kant; and - most influentially - the evolutionary etiology of what had 
60 Pals, Seven Theories of Religion, pp. 36-7. 
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been taken as contrived design. The patterns in nature could no longer 
furnish in so unchallenged a fashion the corroboration and even the warrant 
for grounded religious belief Charles Darwin, as paradigmatic a figure in 
the late nineteenth century as Isaac Newton had been in the eighteenth, 
recognised that a nail had been driven into a coffin: 'The old argument 
from design in Nature as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so 
conclusive, fails now that the law of natural selection has been discovered. '61 
Foundational religious reflection in the West shifted from nature to 
human nature, from the patterns found in one to the exigencies demanded 
by the other. Now God was not to explain design, but to make the ethical 
enterprise possible or human history intelligible. Otherwise there was only 
absurdity, mindless and ungrounded affirmations. To affirm the reality of 
God became, in Kant's formulation, a 'subjective necessity', a postulate 
whose denial would leave human beings with categorical commands whose 
attainment could only be haphazard and random. But the great classical 
atheists of the nineteenth century such as Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and 
Freud, took up the argument precisely at this point, at the philosophical 
appeals to human nature as warrant for the affirmation of the existence of 
God. The case was read exactly in reverse. Not only did humanity not need 
God for the coherence of its development, but the progress of the human 
entailed the denial of God in any recognisable reading of that term. The 
corruption of the one became the necessary condition for the generation 
of the ocher. The ethical or social advance of humanity demanded chat it 
claim for human beings themselves the excellence chat they had historically 
projected onto an imaginary subject. 
At the same time, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century, there was another shift in the focus of fundamental thinking. 
Major thinkers in greater numbers were looking for the foundations of 
all warranted assertions not so much in a prior analysis of human cogni-
tion or epistemologies or phenomenologies of spirit- a nineteenth-century 
enterprise that reaches for its beginning back to John Locke. Their search 
increasingly was turning to language and action as fundamental, to various 
forms of semantics and pragmatics and existentialisms that found these to 
be 'the house of being'. Generically, chis constituted a turn to human expe-
rience in its various forms of expression as foundational, as that expression 
is embodied in words or in deeds. Semantics and pragmatics were increas-
ingly seen as prior and fundamental to analyses of human consciousness 
and, even more, of the nature of things. 
61 Charles Darwin, The Autobiography of Charles Darwin and Selected Letters, ed. Francis Darwin (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 63. 
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As John Locke had prophetically anticipated the shift of Western foun-
dational chinking co epistemologies, so Giovanni Battista Vico had antic-
ipated the massive shifts chat would occur in the lace nineteenth cen-
tury from concerns about cognition as foundational co language and 
action. For Vico insisted chat human beings can adequately know - have 
scienza about - not what confronts chem in nature or in consciousness, 
but only what they have made. 62 Culture, then, becomes all-important -
whether literary and artistic products or social and religious practices and 
institutions. 
Thus the semantic and pragmatic turn in foundational chinking was 
somewhat mirrored in theological reflection by a turn cowards the scientific 
study of religion. This turn did not counter, but transposed, the concern 
of the previous period for warrant either co assert or co deny the reality of 
a transcendent, even Christian, God. 
As the nineteenth century advanced, then, the conviction was declin-
ing chat either contrived designs within nature or the exigencies of human 
nature could ground a reasonable assertion of the reality of God. Bue there 
was still another 'topic' from which arguments for the existence of God 
had classically derived strength and credibility since the dawn of civilisa-
tion: the argument from the universal consent of humankind. Belief in 
the divine had been recognised as always and universally a part of human 
convictions, and chis had been philosophically recognised as celling from 
the time of Plato's Laws63 or Ariscocle's De Caelo. 64 Like the corresponding 
62 Gianbattista Vico, The New Science, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1968). In this wider sense, scienw nuova embraces both philosophy and 
philology. See 'Introduction', F3. The philologians include grammarians, historians, and critics 'who 
have occupied themselves with the study of the languages and the deeds of peoples,' Book I, #138-40. 
63 Plato, The laws I0.886a-888d. In Plato's laws, the Athenian argues chat the existence of the divine 
is 'the most certain of all realities', advancing stories and prayers and sacrifices as evidence against 
chose whose 'wane of faith in the stories heard so often in earliest infancy, while still at the breast, 
from their mothers and nurses - stories, you may say, crooned over them, in sport and in earnest, 
like spells - and heard again in prayers offered over sacrifices in conjunction with the spectacle 
which gives such incense delight co the eye and ear of children, as it is enacted at a sacrifice, che 
spectacle of our parents addressing their god, which assured belief in their existence, in earnest 
prayer and supplication for themselves and their children. Then again, at rising and setting of the 
sun and moon, they have heard and seen the universal prostrations and devotions of mankind, 
Greek and non-Greek alike, in all che various circumstances of evil fortune and good, with their 
implication chat gods are no fictions, but the most certain of realities and their being beyond che 
remotest shadow of doubt.' 
64 Aristocle, De Caelo 1.3.27ob5-8. In the problematic method of Aristotle, the same consensus, found 
in che usages of religion, served to confirm astronomical theories about che primary body: 'Our 
theory seems to confirm experience and to be confirmed by it. For all human beings have some 
conception of the nature of the gods, and all who believe in the existence of gods at all, whether 
barbarian or Greek, agree in allotting che highest place to the deity, surely because they suppose chat 
immortal is linked with immorcal and regard any ocher supposition as inconceivable.' 
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evidence from nature and human nature, universal consent would vary che-
macically as it ran through two thousand years of intellectual history in the 
Wesc.65 
Charles Darwin maintained chat by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
with the demise of design and morality as bases of theistic appeal, universal 
consensus was the lase argument left. 'Ac the present day, che most usual 
argument for the existence of an intelligent God is drawn from the deep 
inward conviction and feelings which are experienced by most persons.' 
Darwin could not share these feelings. 'le may be truly said chat I am like 
a man who has become colour-blind, and the universal belief by men of 
the existence of redness makes my present loss of perception of not the 
least value as evidence.' The issue of divine existence is joined at 'universal 
belief', and Darwin is prophetic in assessing the damage chat the study of 
religion will work. 'This argument would be a valid one if all men of all 
races had the same inward convictions of the existence of one God; but we 
know chat chis is very far from being the case.'66 That is why both sides 
of chis controversy looked to the emerging scientific study of religion for 
resources and confirmation. Was the consensus universal and sempiternal 
or was it at lease primitive and prehistoric? 
Fundamental revelation 
There was a second reason and a more theological one why the scientific 
study of religion figured critically in the rhetoric for and against atheism. 
Genesis had caught chat a primordial self-revelation of God cook place 
with the creation of humanity, a revelation believed by Christians co be 
brought to its fullness finally in Jesus Christ. The various denominations 
of Christian faith claimed co be responses co chat revelation. Now, just 
as contemporary physicists expect to find now in the cosmos the resid-
ual radiation chat bespeaks the 'big bang' of some sixteen billion years 
ago, so the credibility of the scriptures was co be confirmed or denied 
65 The argument from universal consent will vary according to the parameters offered by a particular 
philosophy, but even when the doctrines and practices of the popular cults were dismissed as absurd 
by, for example, the Epicureans, this school would still assert chat belief in the gods has not been 
established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus of 
humankind. The Epicureans traced this universal belief to an internal, self-justifyingpro/epsis, while 
the Stoics, acknowledging its cogency and connecting it with the ritual practices of divination and 
the public recognition of epiphanies, credited its origins to the self-manifestation of the internal 
rationality of the universe. Even the New Academy accepted universal consensus as a tradition 
within the Roman Republic. Again, religion bore to consciousness the universality of belief in the 
divine, and this had stood as evidence for the affirmation of God for two millennia. For these 
divergent understandings of universal consensus, see Michael J. Buckley, S. J., Motion and Motions 
God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), Part 11, pp. 89-156. 
66 Darwin, Autobiography, p. 65 (emphasis added). 
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by what one discovered in religion's beginnings. Not chat one necessarily 
expected to uncover primordial revelation, but at least to come upon the 
effects of that revelation in the history of religions. Joseph J. Baierl, the 
American translator of Wilhelm Schmidt, was typical of the apologists of 
that time: 
The apologist's task is, indeed, a manifold one: to present the essence, scope, and 
content of primitive revelation; to show, in the light of prehistory, anthropology, 
and ethnology, that the earliest known men were capable of receiving such a 
revelation; to point out how many branches of natural science actually confirm its 
historiciry; and, finally, to reconstruct its fate after men's fall and dispersion. 
And what must Baierl's reconstruction expect to prove? 
Even though the light of revelation dimmed as the race grew, and even though the 
darkness of paganism practically extinguished it, yet it continued to glow among 
those peoples who remained at the most primitive levels of culture; until at last 
it was entrusted to the keeping of God's chosen people, Israel, and thus became 
man's common heritage once more. 67 
In a very different vein, Pettazzoni finds Schmidt's Urmonotheismus 'a 
return, by a different way, to the old position of the doctrine of revelation'. 68 
So the scientific study of religion, whether as resource or as threat, was 
inescapably drawn into the controversies about the existence of God. If the 
inquiry into primordial or primitive religions disclosed no presence of an 
Urmonotheismus, not only did the argument from universal consent fail, 
but the Judeo-Christian affirmation of a primordial revelation was read as 
unsustainable. 
Not only were Eliade's Five inducted into these partisan conflicts, they 
were marked by the colours under which they enlisted. Their religious affil-
iations came to accredit or discredit their study of religions. Eliade noted 
chis with Wilhelm Schmidt: 'Schmidt, though a very able scholar, was also a 
Catholic priest, and the scientific world suspected him of apologetic inten-
cions.'69 On the other hand, Gaston Richard- once the disciple Durkheim 
thought the best qualified to be his successor- bitterly criticized the Master 
for the injection of 'dogmatic atheism' into his sociology of religion. Thus: 
it becomes all che more necessary to show that where religion exercises the maxi-
mum influence on sociery, as among primitive peoples, it manages entirely without 
67 Joseph J. Baierl, 'Introduction' to his translation of Primitive Religion by Wilhelm Schmidt 
(St. Louis, MO: Herder, 1939), p. iv. Actually this work is an amalgam of Schmidt's writings done 
by the translator, adapted to Baierl's series of apologetic works. 
68 Raffaele Pettazzoni, 'The Formation of Monotheism', in Essays in the History of Religions, p. 4. 
69 Mircea Eliade, 'The Quest for the "Origins" of Religion', pp. 45-6. 
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the idea of God. The essay on values gives us the last word on the religious phi-
losophy of Durkheim but it is the task of Les formes elementaires co present the 
scientific proof.7° 
RELIGION AND THEOLOGY: FINAL REFLECTIONS 
Bue no matter how differently the story of origins could have been cold, 
evaluated and employed, I wonder if something far more profound did not 
get lost in the translation between the Middle Ages' and the contemporary 
understanding and scientific study of' religion'. And I wonder if what got 
lost was 'God' - God as the purpose, and, in this way, the specification 
of religio. Christianity believes chat God gave human life not simply itself 
and things created to enhance it, but God gave Himself For Aquinas, 
religion occurred as a virtue within an individual or a community when 
one apperceived something of chis and gave oneself to God in some way, as 
through vow or sacrifice or prayer. Religio thus bespoke God as specifying 
purpose and. cook its own shape from what was appropriately rendered co 
God - so much so chat Aquinas could say chat the whole purpose of his 
Summa theologiae is co treat chose things chat pertain to Christian religion.7' 
Much of the scientific study of religion stood religion on its head. It 
turned the focus of religio upon human beings, with the symbols, beliefs, 
practices indicating stages in their development, and with God or the gods 
subsumed as yet another indicator of human culture and its evolvemenc. 
Religion, as Jonathan Z. Smith insists, became an anthropological category. 
When God is assessed primarily as one more unit within a congeries of 
cultural units and criteria, the issue of atheism has already been engaged 
and seeded. The god that is one more thing does not exist. The god chat 
obtains his intrinsic interest and importance because of the light he sheds 
upon human life does not exist. God is either incomprehensibly absolute in 
His being and in His goodness and so adored in His self-communication, 
or God is not at all. It remained only for the inherent contradiction of such 
a setclement to work itself out dialectically in the explicit negation of what 
had already been implicicly denied. 
But a Christian theologian need not be satisfied chat this is the end 
of the road for rheology and the scientific study of religion. Could reli-
gion - even understood as chis congeries of individual units specified by the 
70 G. Richard, 'Dogmatic Atheism in the Sociology of Religion', in Durkheim on Religion: a selection 
of readings with bibliography by W. S. F. Pickering (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 
pp. 254, 270-2. 
7' Summa theologiae 1. Prologus. 
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sacred - could religion not also be a productive theological category, i.e., 
could it not offer subject matter for inquiry that is precisely theological? 
Could the scientific study of religion disclose something about God, not 
simply about human culture? If the Christian finds, for example, the classic 
Pauline signs of the Spirit of God - love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, 
goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control - is it not of theological 
interest to inquire what presence in this religion has fostered so sacred an 
atmosphere? 72 And cannot the Christ of Christianity- classically the norma 
normans non normata - illumine rather than universally be set in compe-
tition with what is discovered in the scientific study of religion? Christian 
theology might well attend to such a study, to seek not so much data about 
human culture but quite explicitly what it can learn of God. 
Nostra aetate, for example, recognised that women and men have peren-
nially questioned the various religions of the world about God, taken up 
with a haunting search: 'What is that ultimate and unutterable mystery 
which engulfs our being, and whence we take our rise, and whither our 
journey leads us?' From the dawn of humanity, it maintains, there has 
emerged 'a certain perception of that hidden power which hovers over the 
course of things and over the events of human life'. 73 Do Christian theo-
logians - precisely in their recognition both of the normative character 
of God's revelation in Christ and also of the 'lives of these people with 
a profound religious sense' - have nothing to learn about God from the 
centuries of that experience? 
Such theological attention and inquiry could well be extended to the 
world religions of our own time. Medieval theology could search the newly 
discovered books of Aristotle and Averroes and use neo-Platonic Oionysius 
to learn something of God. Is there nothing for us to learn about God from 
contemporary Islam? If in Hinduism, human beings have for millennia 
'contemplated the divine mystery', does this contemplation have nothing 
to say to our theology - not simply to ascetical disciplines, but to what 
Bonaventure called our apperception of God? 
One of the deleterious effects of the study of religions has been to treat 
these communities and traditions of wisdom and prayer as if they were 
univocal species of the one genus, 'religion', mutually exclusive species 
among which one must make a choice, territories in competition with 
one another. But one wonders if we have not become the victims of our 
72 Galatians 5' 22-23. 
73 Declaration of the Second Vatican Council on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions 
(Nostra aetate} in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Herder and 
Herder), #1, p. 661. 
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own language, and if even the word 'religion' is inappropriate to denote the 
realities or communities they name- so very different in their character as in 
their claims. It is not at all evident that-with appropriate modifications but 
without any of the artificial harmonies that bespeak a soft syncretism - one 
could not participate fully both in a Catholic and in a Quaker community, 
nor even confess oneself a Christian who has also assimilated much of the 
teachings of early Buddhism. The contemporary use of the word 'religion' 
would seem to forestall such an integration, but the early Church was 
able to assimilate great elements out ofNeo-Platonism, Stoicism and Neo-
Pythagorianism. We call these ancient traditions schools of philosophy, but 
I wonder whether, if we came upon them today, afresh, we would not call 
them religions, some even quasi-religious orders. 
The word, 'religion' as we use it, may not be very helpful, introducing 
commonalities and disjunctions that may be unwarranted. Nevertheless, we 
are at present stuck with the term 'world religions'. Nostra aetate maintained 
that 'often' - I repeat the word, often - 'they reflect a ray of that Truth that 
enlightens all human beings' .74 If that is the case, it is an unrealised task for 
contemporary theology - keeping the normativity of God's revelation in 
Christ - to search the 'world religions' for what they can tell us about God. 
Such a carefully disciplined inquiry should amplify or deepen rather than 
necessarily contradict what one has learned of God from Christianity. There 
is no time now to argue and nuance this suggestion with the distinctions 
it obviously cries for, but only to propose that the scientific study of reli-
gion could well call the theological enterprise to an inquiry quite different 
from that which obtained in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For, to 
allow the final word to Nicholas Lash: 'Every Christian, and hence every 
Christian theologian, is called to journey in the direction of deeper knowl-
edge of the things of God, and the journey is a homecoming, for God is 
our end as well as our beginning.'75 
74 Ibid., 2, pp. 661-2. 
75 Nicholas Lash, The Beginning and the End of 'Religion' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 5. 
